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University of Hawaii at Manoa
Environmental eenler
Crawford 317. 2550 Campus Road
Honolulu. Hawaii 96822
Telephone (BOB} 948-7361
October 3, 1984
RP:0044
U.S. EPA Region 9
A ttention: Rhonda Rothschild
215 Fremont Street (At Howard)
San Francisco, California 94105
Dear Ms. Rothschild:
EP A Draft Permit HI6170024719
Hazardous Waste Storage and Treatment
Pacific Missile Range Facility
Kekaha, Kauai
We are hereby responding to your request for comments on the above cited permit
to regulate the management of hazardous waste at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in
Kekaha, Kauai, Hawaii.
We have been assisted in the review of this permit by the following members of the
University of Hawaii community: John Hylin, Agricultural Biochemistry; Roy Takekawa,
Environmental Health and SafetYi Marshall Mock, Stan Yates, and Brian Yamamoto, Kauai
Community College; Jacquelin Miller and Antonio De Oteyza, Environmental Center.
In general, our reviewers found the permit document to be well written and the
specified procedures adequate to assure safe handling and storage of the hazardous waste.
We do, however, have a few comments, questions, Bnd suggestions which we offer
for your consideration.
Page 1.1 and IV.1
As presently drafted the permit appears to limit storage to Otto fuel waste only. Is
this the only type of hazardous waste that can be stored at this facility or would storage
of related or similar chemical wastes be permitted?
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Page 1.4
We note that the permittee shall report to the Regional Administrator within 24
hours any "noncompliance which may endanger health or the environment". The
prescribed 24 hour period may be appropriate for notification of the "Regional
Administrator" in case of some emergencies. However, for emergencies endangering
public drinking water (lA, 1.15(a) or posing a threat to tTthe environment or human health
outside the facilityll, notification of appropriate state/county officials and the Regional
Administrator should surely be required within a much shorter time. Since the facility is
a military establishm ent with personnel a va ilable on a "round-the-clock-basis",
notification of proper authorities within 4 to 6 hours in the event of a hazardous
emergency would seem more appropriate.
Attachment E: Requirements for reactive, ignitable, and incompatible waste.
Description of procedures, structures or equipment used at the (acUity to prevent
contamination and exposure.
Page 41
The permit documentation cites the lack of water wells nearby as the basis for no
concern with potential water contaminants. We would point out that the proximity (or
lack thereof) of wells is not necessarily the key concern. The Barking Sands area is noted
for its dry, highly permeable soils. Any spillage would certainly reach the water table
quickly. The safeguard is not that the nearest water wells are distant, but that they are
inland, whereas any ground water flow in the vicinity is seaward.
Page 45
The statement that "the existing light brown color of the treatment and storage
tanks reflects sunlight and therefore prevents a buildup of heat" seems incorrect. While
the heat absorption of light brown may be less than that of a darker color, nevertheless
heat will be absorbed by the brown tanks. It would seem far better and not physically or
economically unreasonable, given the potential temperature effects cited (Attachment F:
Contingency Plan, page 19), to monitor the temperatures in the trea tm ent and storage
tanks so as to establish worst case baseline conditions and assure that unsafe
temperatures are not achieved on bright hot days.
Attachment F: Contingency Plan--Hazardous Wastes
Page 19
We note that after stablization the wastes are transferred to 2000 gallon portable
tanks to Unitek Environmental Services Inc. on Oahu for disposal. What type of shipping
cargo manifest accompanies this shipment, or what other safety enforcement procedure is
followed, to assure that the volume leaving I{auai arrives on Oahu?
· "
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A description and discussion is provided for contingency plans to be implemented in
the event of various emergency scenarios. Mention is made of a 4" high curb surrounding
the area in which a 3000-gallon storage tank and a lOOO-gallon treatm ent tank are
located, and that the holding capacity of the area within the curb is 1000 gallons. We do
not see a further description of the curbed area that indicates whether or not it is lined,
but the contingency plan covers the case of overflow of the curbed area and
contamination of the soil outside that would require removal of the soil. To prevent
contamination of the soil within the curb, that area would have to be lined. If it is lined,
it would seem preferable to increase the holding capacity of the area within the curb so
that it could contain all of the fluid that might be released by a tank failure (by increasing
the height of the curb) rather than risk contamination of the soil outside. From the
standpoint of economics alone, the relatively modest cost of increasing the curb wall by a
few inches would surely be insignificant compared to the costs of removing contaminated
soil, if that should be necessary, not to mention the additional health and safety
advantages. Incidently, there is no time fram e indicated for contaminated soil removal
under th~ existing plans.
We suggest that the curb be designed so as to prevent fluid from sloshing over it.
We do not see discussion of the hazards that might be associated with earthquakes in
the area. We note that the greatest intensity that has been experienced in the Mana area
in the last 125 years is probably low in the range of Modified Mercalli intensity V (in
1871). We assume that assurance could be given that, even with the recurrence of such an
intensity, significant damage to either the tanks or the curb would be unlikely.
The proposed alternative storage site (Figure 5) seems quite reasonable as it appears
to be well isolated from roads, canefields and traffic. If there will be any off loading of
the storage tanks from the semi-trailers to the site itself1 then some additional protective
bermed structures may need to be considered in case of accidents during off loading. If
the semi-trailers are just parked with their loads at the alternative site until the
emergency condition abates, then special storage site foundations are probably not
necessary.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this permit.
Yours truly,
Doak C. Cox
Director
cc: John Hylin
Roy Takekawa
Marshall Mock
Stan Yates
Brian Yamamoto
Jacquelin Miller
Antonio De Oteyza
